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CIVIL DISTURBANCES AND THE RULE OF LAW
0. W. WILSON
The author is Chicago's Superintendent of Police, a position he has held since 1960.
During his student days at the University of California (A.B., 1924), Superintendent Wilson worked
as a police officer on the Berkeley, California, Police Department.
After holding two posts as Chief of Police (at Fullerton, California, 1925-26, and at Wichia,t
Kansas, 1928-39), Superintendent Wilson joined the faculty of the University of California as
Professor of Police Administration. In 1950 he was appointed Dean of the University's School of
Criminology and he served in that capacity until his 1960 appointment as Chicago's Superintendent
of Police.
During the interim of 1939-1950, he was a police consultant to the Public Administration Service
of Chicago, and also to the Insular Government of Puerto Rico; and from 1943 until 1947 he was a
Lieutenant Colonel, and later a Colonel, in the United States Army Corps of Military Police in
Germany and Italy.
Among his various publications he has authored three books: Police Records (1942); Police

Planning (1951); and Police Administration (1950; 1963).
In recognition of Superintendent Wilson's outstanding contributions and services, and particularly
his administration and development of the Chicago Police Department, he was awarded the honorary
degree of Doctor of Laws by Northwestern University in June, 1965.
The present article is based upon a speech superintendent Wilson delivered at the annual meeting
of the John Henry Wigmore club of Northwestern University School of Law on January 31, 1967.
It contains a penetrating analysis of the problem confronting the police today with respect to the civil
rights issue. In it Superintendent Wilson also discusses police tactics and techniques that should be
of considerable value to other police departments in civil disturbances situations.
During the Summer of 1966 Chicago experienced two kinds of serious civil disturbances.
Neither was classifiable, however, as a "race
riot".

TYPES oF Crv

DISTUR3ANCES

My definition of a "race riot" is a situation
where a group of persons of one race engages in
actual physical combat with members of another
race. This we did not have in Chicago.
Of the civil disturbances that occurred, one kind
resulted from civil rights demonstrations-in the
form of marches, picketing, "sit-downs", "sit-ins",
and boycotts.
A disturbance may or may not stem from a civil
rights demonstration. In Chicago we had a number
of marches into areas where the cause in question
was unpopular-for example, the march of Negroes,
and those friendly to the cause they espoused, into
white neighborhoods to protest what they believe
to be unequal housing opportunities in the area.
Although the marches often led to serious disturbances, there were other forms of demonstrations that produced no serious disturbances.

Another kind of disturbance that Chicago experienced might be termed a "riot", but by no
means a "race riot". The causes of riots are
difficult to determine. They may be touched off
by a single arrest, a justifiable shooting by a police
officer, or any other incident from which there
would be no repercussions in other areas of the
city.
The events which touch off riots are not the real
causes of them. The causes are rooted more deeply
in the neighborhood, the community, the family,
and the times we live in. Once this type of disturbance begins, it snowballs at a fantastic rate
and soon thousands of citizens are in the streets,
fires are started, windows are smashed, looting
is widespread, and the police are physically attacked by the mobs. We had two major occurrences of this type this past Summer-one in a
predominantly Puerto Rican neighborhood, and
one in a predominantly Negro neighborhood.
In connection with the riot that occurred in
July of '66 on Chicago's Near West Side, which is
predominantly Negro, a total of 533 persons were
arrested and charged with crimes ranging from
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arson and burglary to possession of stolen property
and disorderly conduct. Of these, 155 were juveniles. In the area of the disturbance between
July 12th and July 17th a total of 61 police officers
were injured. Eight of these were shot, 24 received
injuries from bricks, bottles and other objects
thrown at them, and 12 were bitten, not by dogs,
but by human beings. This particular serious disturbance was ended by sending approximately
2000 National Guardsmen into the area.
TYPES oF PARTICIPANTS
There are not only two types of civil disturbances but also two basic types of persons who may
participate in civil rights demonstrations. The
first of these is the honest, forthright individual
who sincerely believes, whether correctly or incorrectly, that a march or other demonstration is a
proper and legal means for the betterment of our
society. The individuals who regularly engage in
civil rights demonstrations and thereby become
involved in civil disturbances include aggressive
leaders who plan and promote the action, as well
as large numbers who are prompted to participate
in the action by the leaders. Some of the leaders
are local, but many are from other parts of the
country who came to Chicago for this express purpose.
The other basic type of individual is the person who is bent on destroying our society for
political, social or other reasons. He sees the civil
rights demonstration as a vehicle for his nefarious
purpose. He joins the various civil rights organizations in order to use them to further his own ends.
Sadly enough, some persons within the first category are taken in by these individuals who are
intent on destroying our democratic way of life.
Here is where the biggest danger lies.
With the problem in this perspective, let us now
consider the police role.
PoLIcE ROLE
The police are not charged with the duty of
correcting the social inequities that exist in our
society. There are other agencies that have this
responsibility. Our job is to enforce the law, and
in doing so there are two basic policies from which
we will not deviate. First, the Chicago Police
Department will not take sides. We make no judgments as to who is morally right and who is wrong.
We merely enforce the law equally as to all persons.
Second, we arrest all persons who violate the law
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if it is within our power to do so. We have a booklet which we call On This We Stand; we characterize it as "a compilation of operating policies
formulated and approved by the Command Staff of
the Chicago Police Department" and that is
exactly what it is. In the booklet we state:
All persons are entitled to seek redress of
grievances through free speech, peaceful
assembly, peaceful picketing, and distribution
of handbills. This does not mean that everyone
with opinions or beliefs to express may do so
at any place and at any time without regard
for the maintenance of public order or in violation of the Law.
The Laws of our Country, our State, and
our City are written for all our people. It is
police policy to take whatever action may be
necessary to enforce the Laws and Ordinances
which protect the rights and property of all
citizens. This means arrest and court appearance for those who break the Law. Trouble
can be prevented when there is respect for
Law and Order and respect for the Civil
Rights and privileges of all.
We not only espouse this theory; we do our best
to live by it!
POLICE TACTICS AND TECHNIQUES

Based upon our stated policy, the following
police tactics and techniques are invoked in civil
disturbance situations. As described in On This
We Stand, they are:
The department will deal quickly and decisively with any civil disturbance.
In civil disturbances there is a temptation
to temporize--that is, to avoid or delay taking
action in the hope that the problem will dissolve of its own accord or that it will be solved
by local leaders. The services of local leaders
and other citizens in restoring order and a
state of normalcy should be sought and
encouraged. But in accepting such services,
a deviation from normal police practices and
normal community life must not be permitted.
Experience in Chicago and in other parts of
the country has shown that the result of temporizing is a worsening of the situation, due to
the fact that the disorder tends to increase in
size and to become more aggressive.
A delay in effecting arrests or taking decisive action in such instances is justifiable
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only if, in the judgment of the ranking officer,
sufficient manpower is not on hand to assure
that law and order will prevail. An amount of
manpower should be summoned, sufficient in
number, to eliminate any question as to the
capability of the department to cope with a
given situation.
It has become apparent that what we refer to as
"temporizing" is a solution to nothing. During the
disturbance in the predominantly Puerto Rican
neighborhood of Chicago in June of last year,
local leaders in that community convinced us that
if we removed all uniformed police from the area,
leaving only plain clothes undercover men at the
scene, they, the leaders, would be able to calm
the crowds and get them off the streets. This was
suggested on the theory that the mere presence of
the police incensed the crowd. I am sure that the
leaders did this in good faith, under the misapprehension that they had the power to handle the
situation. We were dealing with responsible members of the community but they were wrong. We
pulled the uniformed men out and all was quiet
for a short period, but then the whole thing
flared up again with renewed intensity. We had
to return the police into an area which was now
much hotter than when they left. I am convinced
that law and order would have been restored
much sooner had we not succumbed to the somewhat natural tendency to temporize. I have read
that police officers in other areas of the country
have said that in handling these disturbances one
should avoid a show of force. I believe that just the
opposite is true. It should be made apparent to all
involved that there is sufficient force to quell any
disorder that might occur and that the police are
willing to use it. We learned our lesson last June.
This brings me to the second and related major
tactical blunder that the police have a tendency
to commit-that is, the failure to provide sufficient
manpower to handle a given situation. I said that
a show of force is good. Well, that's one reason
you should have it, but the second and more
important reason is that without sufficient manpower the police become less than ineffective. Not
only are they unable to maintain order and make
arrests for violations of the law, but they are in
grave danger of being overwhelmed by the mob.
What's more, those in the crowd who are bent on
mischief or inclined toward crime immediately
sense the dilemma of the police and actually

urge the mob on to more violence, thus increasing
the need for more manpower.
To counter this snowballing effect and to insure
that the maximum amount of manpower is available we have put several plans into operation.
First, we have a task force of several hundred
men, and through it we can field a force of about
250 men on very short notice to supplement
district personnel already in the area. These men
receive special training in crowd control and
operate as a unit. The latter gives us the continuity and unity of command and the solidarity
which hastily gathered forces lack. Also, when
disturbances are expected, we place a sergeant,
seven patrolmen, and a squadrol (our "paddy
wagon") with its two-man crew on standby alert
in each district. These additional men are available almost immediately to assist in quelling or
preventing a disturbance in any part of the city.
They can be ordered into an area which is close
to the scene when the need for them seems imminent and then either moved into the actual disturbance area or returned to their districts as the
situation evolves. Each squadrol so assigned is
equipped with a packet of complaint forms covering crimes common to civil disturbances, such as
mob action, criminal damage to property, and
resisting arrest.
There are other ways of supplying additional
manpower, such as requiring men to work into
the next watch, canceling days off, and putting the
force on 12-hour shifts. But every police department has its limit and sooner or later may reach
it as we did in July. When this happens, the National Guard should be called in. In the August 8
issue of U. S. News and World Report I was quoted
as saying, "There is no substitute for force in
quelling civil disturbances, and if the police are
unable to provide the manpower to restore normalcy, then there is no alternative but to put in
a call for the National Guard-and as quickly as
possible". This is my view in a nutshell. There
should be no shame or reticence involved. To
temporize or to continue without sufficient manpower is futile.
I would also like to mention, in passing, a couple
of techniques with which we have had particular
success. One of them is called "Operation Trojan
Horse". We have ten large air conditioned prisoner
vans, and when we expect trouble along the course
of a particular march we load one or more of them
with police officers. They will hold 25 men com-
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fortably and up to 40 men somewhat uncomfortably. The van follows along behind the
marchers or on a parallel street. When trouble
arises, the van is summoned by walkie-talkie; the
men are unloaded; they make arrests and the
prisoners are loaded into the van.
Another technique is that of diverting the
hecklers. Police officers are stationed in such a
manner as to divert around the corner those
hecklers who are following along beside the marchers. By this means, the hecklers must go around
the block to catch up and must walk, or run,
three blocks for every one of the march. They soon
tire themselves out just trying to keep up.
It is these types of efficient operations which
deter lawlessness.
EFFECT OF CmL DISTURBANCES
GENERAL

ON CRIVE IN

In 1965, Chicago ended the year with a 12%
decrease in index crimes as compared with 1964.
On June 22, 1966, the cumulative increase as
compared to the same period in 1965 was less than
1%. That is, we were about even with the preceding year, as of June 22. However, between
that time and September 14 (the period in which
most of the serious civil disturbances occurred)
the cumulative increase over the comparable 1965
figures was up to 7.8%.
We compile statistics on a 13 police period basis.
Each police period covers four weeks. In the 7th
police period of 1966 (June 23 thru July 20)
serious crimes increased 12.3% over the 7th police
period of 1965; in the 8th police period (July 21
thru August 17) crime increased 29.8%; and in
the 9th police period (August 18 thru September
14) crime increased 19.9%. This brought the
cumulative increase for the first nine police periods
or 36 weeks of 1966 up to 7.8%.
This increase we attribute to the fact that a
tremendous amount of police personnel and effort had been diverted from crime fighting to
dealing with civil disturbances. This theory is
reinforced by the fact that during the 8th police
period, the 8th District, where most of the disturbances occurred and which received most of
the manpower diversion, was the only district
which showed a decrease in serious crimes.
The high crime rate continued into the 10th
police period (September 14th thru October 12th),
which showed an increase of 13.2% over the 10th
police period of 1965. Significantly, this increase
occurred in spite of the fact that only minimal
amounts of police effort and manpower were ex-
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pended on controlling civil disturbances. As a
result, we ended the year with an increase in
serious crimes of 4.8% over 1965. I can only condude from this that civil unrest engenders an
attitude of lawlessness which may continue for
some time after the disturbances have ended.
TnE Cr.AtNAL COURTS
The police are the arm of our system of administration of justice charged with apprehending law
violators, while the courts must mete out the
punishment. Both are absolutely necessary to the
system. If the police act quickly and decisively
and the courts do not, the system breaks down.
Disturbances almost invariably result in the
arrest of large numbers of persons within a short
period of time. Such arrests create some judicial
problems that the police themselves can solve;
for example, the problem that arises when one
officer has arrested several persons. A general
statement such as "they were all disorderly, Your
Honor", will not suffice, and the court in such a
situation has no recourse but to release the
prisoners. To combat this we have men on the
scene to photograph the accused-if possible, while
he is violating the law, or, as an alternative, when
he is entering the squadrol. He is also photographed in the police station, alongside the arresting officer.
Photographs thus taken permit the arresting
officer to refresh his recollection as to the identity
of the person or persons he had arrested. He can
then give accurate, intelligent, and truthful
testimony in court, and the photographs themselves afford reliable evidence of guilt.
There are other problems, however, which the
police can solve only with court cooperation. One
is the presentation of arrestees in court; under
normal circumstances the courts are not equipped
to handle mass arrests.
The First Municipal District of the Circuit
Court of Cook County has established procedures
to be followed in such situations. By written order,
the court prescribes what is to be done when fifty
or more persons are arrested in any one incident.
According to the day and time of the arrest, and
in some instances according to the area of the
city in which the arrests were made, a branch of
the court is designated, and a time for presentation
is specified in the order. This type of cooperation
has been very beneficial to the courts and the
police. In the Summer of 1966, 450 arrestees were
processed in this manner.
Another means of cooperation between the
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courts and the police is our system under which
the court complaint transmittal listing of prisoners, made up by the police, goes with the prisoners to the court and is used as a docket sheet.
This eliminates the old problem of cases not being
heard because the court docket sheet for that call
had already been made up.
The police of this country will not be able to
reverse the trend and attitude of lawlessness and
return the community to normalcy unless an
arrest means something-that is, unless we have
a system of justice that is swift and sure.
CVrrL COURTS
The non-criminal, civil courts also have a considerable responsibility with respect to civil disturbances.
During the Summer of '66 there were several
civil rights groups which conducted marches into
areas of Chicago where a majority of the residents
were not sympathetic with the view of the marchers. I believe that it was the aim of these marchers
to subject themselves to violence. If the marches
were conducted without incident, nothing would
be gained. The violence which occurs is in fact
their bargaining wedge. If violence occurs, they
can make demands upon the city administration
and in return for the granting of those demands
agree to end the marches and thereby the violence.
Otherwise they have no bargaining power. For
this reason, those in charge of the marches do not
really want adequate police protection and control, although they say they do.
At first, the leaders of the marches agreed to
notify the police sufficiently in advance of the
march so that the police might mobilize an adequate force to control the onlookers, hecklers,
and other trouble makers. Only twice, however,
were we notified. Much to the credit of the police
officers involved, an admirable job of mobilizing
and controlling the crowds was done in spite
of the fact that we learned of impending marches
sometimes less than one hour in advance. Then
the leaders hit upon the idea of holding simultaneous marches in more than one area of the
city. I can only assume that their purpose was
to further hinder police protection and control
and in that way strengthen their bargaining position.
Up until this time the position of the city administration had been that the marchers were
within their rights and that there was no legal
basis for enjoining them from marching. But at

this point, Chicago's Mayor, Richard J. Daley,
decided that it was time to act to protect the rights
of all citizens. At the request of the Mayor, the
Corporation Counsel filed a suit for an injunction
on behalf of the City of Chicago and myself as
Superintendent of Police. The complaint pointed
out: that the marches were diverting needed police
manpower and effort from other areas of the city
where it was needed; that as a result, the crime
rate had risen; that the marchers had failed to
cooperate with the police by not notifying the
police of their intended activity; that simultaneous
marches were being planned and that the effect
of simultaneous marches would be to deprive the
marchers themselves of police protection, along
with an accompanying deprivation of police protection for the life, limb, and property of the city's
3Y2 million citizens.
The relief sought was not that the protesters be
enjoined from marching, which is their constitutional right. All that was requested was an injunction against utnreasonable activity. Specifically
the request was to enjoin them from:
1. Conducting simultaneous demonstrations
on public property;
2. Conducting demonstrations in which more
than 500 persons would participate;
3. Conducting demonstrations without notifying the police of the time, place, number
of participants and other pertinent data at
least 24 hours in advance; and
4. Conducting demonstrations on public property during peak traffic periods or during
other than daylight hours.
A temporary injunction was granted on August
19, 1966.
Here, then, was an application of the rule of
reason.
In granting the injunction the court balanced
the interest of the individual against those of
society itself, a line of reasoning that is absolutely
indispensable to orderly, democratic existence.
The police ask no more of the courts than that
they be guided by the rule of reason, and here in
Chicago, I think it is evident that they are so
guided.
I urge law-abiding citizens to take every lawful
measure within their power to insure that our
courts remain above the transitory pressures of
injustice, and that our judges and lawyers are
not blinded by the cries of individual rights.
We must all be guided by the rule of reason,
lest we lose our birthright-the rule of law.

